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Extradition from Israel
M. Dennis Gouldman*

INTRODUCTION
Stated rather crudely, the State of Israel both exports and imports criminals. This is also true of every other country. It is therefore vital that the
State of Israel and the law enforcement authorities of other nations work
together in order to reduce this two-way traffic. Indeed, one of the main
aims of international co-operation in criminal matters is to secure the
surrender of fugitive criminals so that they stand trial or return to prison
in the countries from which they have fled.
In order to achieve this aim, something must be known of the legal
conditions to be fulfilled before a fugitive can be transferred from one
country to another. The purpose of this article is to give lawyers outside
Israel some idea of the legal issues to be tackled when a request for extradition is submitted to the State of Israel. The fate of the wanted person
seeking refuge in Israel will be determined not only by Israel's treaty
commitments but also by her extradition legislation, as interpreted by the
local courts and implemented by the executive agencies. This article will
examine the conditions under which a fugitive offender can be removed
from Israel and handed over to the foreign state seeking his return.
Following an introduction, the main part of the article will review the
law of extradition from Israel-a subject about which little is known
outside this country. 1 The discussion will focus on the decisions and
practices of both the judiciary and the executive. The remainder of the
article will consider special problems that have arisen in Israel as a country
with an "open gate" immigration policy for the Jews of the world and a
new unwillingness to hand over its own nationals for trial and sentence
abroad.
* The author is Head of The International Section, State Attorney's Department, Ministry
of Justice, State of Israel. This article represents only the author's views and is in no way
official.
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How an Extradition Request Is Handled
So that the points discussed later in this article may be seen against their
overall background, the way in which Israel deals with a foreign state's
request for extradition will be briefly outlined.
At the request of a state with whom Israel has an extradition treaty,
Israeli authorities are empowered to arrest the fugitive offender and hold
him briefly in custody to enable the requesting state to prepare and submit
a request for his extradition. 2 The police authorities of the requesting state
usually send the request for preliminary arrest by telex to the Interpol
bureau of the Israeli police. Once the wanted person has been traced in
Israel and detained or released on bail, the embassy of the requesting state
will submit a formal request for his extradition to the Claims Division of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. The request will be accompanied by all the evidence necessary to show the accused's participation
in the crime of which he is accused, or to prove his conviction and sentence
by the courts of the requesting state.
From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the request moves on to the
International Section of the State Attorney's Department in the Ministry
of Justice. After examination of the request and its accompanying evidence, the Department's lawyers bring the matter before the Minister of
Justice with a recommendation as to what action should be taken. If the
Minister of Justice feels that there is a proper case for extradition proceedings, he will order that the wanted person be brought before a District
Court 3 to determine whether he is subject to extradition. 4 On receipt of
the Minister's order, the Attorney General's representative will draft the
appropriate extradition petition and submit it to the District Court. 5 The
Attorney General's representative will also file with the court the foreign
state's request and its accompanying documents so that the requested
person and his attorney may examine the prosecution's arguments and
evidence, and prepare a defense. On the other hand, the requested person
need not disclose any lines of defense he may wish to pursue or disclose
any evidence he may wish to present at the extradition hearing. Once an
extradition petition has been filed, the District Court may order the wanted
person to be held in custody until the end of the extradition proceedings
against him. 6
The extradition petition is considered by a single judge of the District
Court. The Attorney General's representative opens, explains the written
evidence submitted by the foreign state and presents any oral evidence he
may wish to produce. This oral evidence could, for example, be expert
testimony as to foreign law, incriminating statements made by the wanted
person in Israel, or evidence showing that property stolen abroad was
found in the wanted person's possession in Israel. The requested person
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then presents his arguments and any evidence he may wish to introduce.
He is entitled to give evidence himself if he so wishes but cannot be
compelled to testify. The Attorney General's representative sums up, followed by the wanted person's counsel. 7
In an extradition hearing the Attorney General's representative must
satisfy the court that the conditions of the Extradition Law have been
complied with and that there exists sufficient, admissible evidence to justify bringing the wanted person to trial had he committed the acts complained of in Israel. If the court is convinced that these requirements have
been fulfilled, it will declare the wanted person subject to extradition and
specify the crimes for which he can be extradited to the requesting state. 8
Otherwise, the court will dismiss the extradition petition.
Both sides have the right to appeal against the District Court's decision
before the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as a court of criminal appeal. 9
The Supreme Court hears oral argument from both parties before rendering its decision. If the District Court's decision declaring the wanted person
to be subject to extradition is upheld on appeal, or if no appeal is filed, the
decision that the wanted person is subject to extradition becomes final. 10
The matter then returns to the executive branch of government and the
Minister of Justice must decide-at his discretion-whether or not to order
the extradition. If the Minister of Justice signs such an order, Israel will
surrender the wanted person to the requesting state. "1After the police
forces of the two countries arrange for the transportation of the fugitive,
Israeli authorities will hand him over to a police officer of the requesting

state.

12

The Extradition Law
The Extradition Law of 1954 provides the legislative framework for the
subject under review. 13 The statute is directed primarily at the conditions
and procedure for the extradition of a requested person from Israel. 14
Section 1 lays down the general principle that a person in Israel shall
not be extradited to another state save under the Extradition Law. 15 Israel
does, of course, have treaty obligations in matters of extradition. Indeed
the existence of an extradition agreement with the requesting state is a
prerequisite for the consideration of a request for extradition. But in the
final analysis the provisions of the statute will prevail and no court in Israel
can allow the extradition of a fugitive offender unless all the conditions
laid down by the statute are strictly fulfilled.
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The Extradition Treaty
Section 2(1) of the Extradition Law stipulates that Israel may extradite only
if there is an agreement between Israel and the requesting state, providing
for reciprocity as to the extradition of offenders. One idea behind the treaty requirement is that Israeli authorities will have carefully checked the
legal system of the other state to preclude the extradition of a person from
Israel to a country in which a fair trial is not ensured or in which penal
conditions fall short of reasonable standards. In interpreting section 2(1)
the question arises as to whether the law requires a full blown extradition
treaty or whether the provisions of the statute would be complied with if
Israel acceded to a note of agreement with a requesting state concerning
a particular fugitive offender. Since section 2(1) requires that the agreement be reciprocal and that it relate to the extradition of offenders it seems
clear that the legislature intended a general agreement as the only basis for
the extradition of a fugitive offender from Israel.
Section 2(1) refers to an agreement "between Israel and the requesting
state." Israel has negotiated, signed and ratified bilateral extradition agreements with nine countries. 16 In 1967, Israel acceded to the European
Convention on Extradition. Through the medium of the Convention, Israel
now has extradition relations with fourteen other countries. 17 In some
cases 18 the provisions of the Convention supersede bilateral treates. 19 In
others, new extradition relations were automatically created with states
that were parties to the convention at the time of Israel's accession, but
with whom Israel had not previously signed extradition accords. The creation of new extradition relations then became a continuing process as
additional countries joined the Convention. 20 As a result of the Convention, Israel today has extradition relations with several countries with
whom she had never entered-and possibly never envisaged enteringinto a bilateral extradition agreement.
The contracting parties to the European Convention have undertaken
to surrender fugitive offenders to one another in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention. 21 By acceding to the Convention, Israel
entered into a reciprocal agreement for the extradition of offenders with
each of the other parties to the Convention. There can be little doubt that
in 1954, when the legislature enacted section 2(1) of the statute, it envisaged that Israel would be signing bilateral extradition agreements with
individual countries. Since that date the treaty-making technique has
changed. The essential requirement of section 2(1) is, however, still satisfied by the reciprocal obligations for the extradition of fugitive offenders
assumed by all the states who are parties to the multilateral convention.
Although the existence of a treaty is a prerequisite for extradition proceedings in Israel, the treaty as such does not become part of Israel's
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internal law. 22 Treaty provisions-while binding between states at the
international level- will be effective in court to regulate the conflict between the State of Israel and the requested fugitive only in so far as the
Extradition Law gives the force of law to the treaty provisions. 23 Moreover, in the event of any conflict between the provisions of the statute and
the treaty (for example, where an offense is extraditable under the treaty
but is not included among the extradition offenses set out in the schedule
to the Extradition Law), the statute will prevail.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXTRADITION FROM ISRAEL
The Wanted Offender
Under section 2(2) of the Extradition Law, Israel may extradite a person
only if "he is charged or has been convicted in the requesting state" of an
extradition offense. The Minister of Justice may direct that a wanted
person be brought before a District Court to determine whether he is
subject to extradition where that person is "charged or convicted" in a
foreign state of an extradition offense. 24 To what stage must the proceedings against the wanted person have advanced before he can be said to be
charged with an extradition offense? This question may be difficult where
the wanted person has managed to reach Israel before the authorities in the
requesting state could interrogate him or formally charge him with an
offense.
Criminal procedure in Israel carefully distinguishes a person charged
with an offense 25 from a suspect. 26 A person is said to be charged with
an offense only after the filing of a formal indictment against him. Since
the Extradition Law refers to a person charged with an offense, some
fugitives have argued that a wanted person against whom an indictment
has not yet been filed in the requesting state cannot be a person charged
within the meaning of the Extradition Law, and therefore cannot be subject to extradition.
This point was considered by the Supreme Court of Israel in Merguerian
v. State of Israel, 27 after the government of Switzerland had requested the
extradition of the appellant in order to bring him before the courts of the
Canton of Tessin, where he was suspected of murder and manslaughter.
The Swiss authorities had not filed an indictment against the appellant
since this was not yet possible under local rules of criminal procedure.
Evidence as to this procedure had been brought before the Israeli District
Court hearing the extradition petition. It appeared that the prosecutor in
the Swiss canton had ordered the accused's arrest and then referred the
matter to the investigating judge of the canton. It was the latter's duty to
collect all the evidence, including that of the suspect if he wished to make
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a statement. The matter then returned to the prosecutor who had to decide,
in light of the evidence gathered by the investigating judge, whether or not
to file an indictment. In Merguerian, the investigating judge had not been
able to complete his task since he could not take a statement from the
appellant, who had fled from Switzerland to Israel; therefore no indictment
had been filed against the appellant in Switzerland.
The Supreme Court of Israel found that even though the Swiss authorities had not fied an indictment, the appellant was nevertheless a person
charged within the meaning of the Extradition Law. In interpreting the
word charged, the Court did not feel bound by the meaning given to this
term in the Israeli Criminal Procedure Law 28 since the wanted offender
was not going to be tried in Israel. For the purpose of the Extradition Law,
all that was required was that appropriate criminal proceedings had been
commenced in the requesting state with the eventual aim of bringing the
wanted person to justice for an extradition offense. The grant of extradition did not depend on those proceedings having reached the stage of filing
an indictment.
In Hanauer v. State of Israel, 29 the United Kingdom requested the appellant's extradition. The magistrates Court in London had taken depositions
from the prosecution witnesses and issued a warrant for the appellant's
arrest, but no indictment against him had been filed. As in Merguerian, the
appellant argued that he could not be considered as a person charged in
the requesting state, within the meaning of section 3 of the statute.
In dismissing this argument, the Supreme Court noted that neither the
Extradition Law nor the extradition treaty between Israel and the United
Kingdom 30 defined the expression charged. The Court interpreted the
term in accordance with its everyday meaning, taking into account the
purpose of the statute in which the phrase appeared. The English court had
seen evidence of the appellant's alleged fraud and forgery, and had issued
an order directing the police to arrest him and bring him before the court.
Given these circumstances, the Court regarded the appellant as a person
charged with an extradition offense, even though no indictment had yet
been fied against him.
The Court was correct in taking a broad view of "a person charged." In
using this term the legislature probably intended that the phrase be interpreted according to its use in Israeli criminal procedure in 1954, rather than
according to the narrow, special meaning later given to the word charged
in the Criminal Procedure Law of 1965. 31 In 1954, the term was used in
a much broader sense to include any person against whom criminal proceedings had been initiated even though no indictment had been fied. 32
In any event, the test propounded in Merguerian still stands: the term a
person charged is interpreted in accordance with the law of the requesting
state. This means that the Attorney General's representative will have to
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adduce evidence as to the requesting state's criminal procedure in cases
where the authorities have not yet filed an indictment against the wanted
person.
Israel will also grant extradition when the fugitive has been convicted
of an extradition offense in the requesting state. In such a case, the court
in Israel must find that the wanted person has been duly convicted 33 but
need not examine the evidence against him in order to determine whether
it justifies binding him over for trial. Unfortunately, even where a conviction has already been obtained, it is not always clear that extradition is
appropriate.
The question arises as to whether a fugitive offender who has been duly
tried and convicted in his absence in the requesting state should be extraditable as a convicted person, or whether the evidence test applicable to
a person merely charged in the requesting state must still be met. This
problem is especially acute because, in Israel, the Extradition Law does not
specify the conditions for extraditing a fugitive convicted in absentia. 34
Moreover, the matter has not yet been addressed by Israeli courts. 35
On the one hand, both the Extradition Law and the treaties with continental countries refer simply to persons convicted in the requesting state.
They impose no limitation on the way that conviction is secured. Since the
statute requires a conviction under foreign law, any conviction duly obtained under the law of the requesting state should serve as a basis for
extradition. The Extradition Ordinance 36 that preceded the Extradition
Law of 1954 provided specifically that the terms "conviction" and "convicted person" were not to include or refer to a conviction which, under
foreign law, is a conviction for contumacy (obtained in the accused's
absence). The Israeli legislature included no such limitation in the 1954
statute and may therefore have intended that any conviction in a foreign
state could serve as a basis for extradition.
On the other hand, there is something in this argument repugnant to
the sense of justice of the Israeli lawyer trained to regard the presence and
participation of the accused in his trial as an essential condition for his
conviction. Some would argue that when the Israeli legislature referred to
the extradition of a person convicted of an offense in the requesting state,
it envisaged an offender who had been convicted after a trial in his presence and then fled to Israel. A person who fled to Israel before his trial in
the requesting state is at most a person charged with an offense and the
evidence requirement must be met before his extradition can be ordered.
It is not equitable to convert him into a person convicted of an offense and
to dispense with the evidence requirement simply by trying him in his
absence after he fled to Israel.
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Extradition Offenses
Not every offense is sufficiently serious to merit the drastic consequences
of removing a person from one country and transferring him against his
will to another state. Israel will extradite a fugitive only if the requesting
state has charged or convicted him of a crime amounting to an "extradition
offense." 37
In Engel and Friedman v. State of Israel 38 the Supreme Court of Israel ex-

plained that three cumulative conditions must be fulfilled before the
crimes with which a fugitive offender is charged can be extradition
offenses. First, the acts attributed to the accused in the extradition request
must be criminal offenses under the law of the requesting state. Second,
these same acts must amount to a criminal offense under the laws of Israel.
Third, such an offense must be one of the extradition offenses set out in
the schedule to the Extradition Law and must also be found in any list of
offenses prescribed in the extradition agreement between Israel and the
requesting state.
Offense under Foreign Law

The whole purpose of the extradition process is to compel the accused to
answer for his deeds before the courts of the requesting state. There would
be no reason to extradite him without the assurance that the acts attributed
to him were indeed offenses under the law of the requesting state. In Engel,
the Attorney General's representative argued that for this requirement to
be satisfied it was sufficient that an indictment had been filed in the
requesting state. He claimed that the Israeli court did not need to enquire
into questions of foreign criminal law, since the requesting state would not
have asked for the extradition of the wanted offender unless it was satisfied that the acts attributed to him were offenses under its internal law.
The Supreme Court of Israel found, however, that it must make this
decision itself. An Israeli court can declare the wanted person subject to
extradition only if it is satisfied, after hearing arguments as to foreign law,
that the acts complained of amounted to an offense in the requesting state.
Double Criminality

The second condition referred to in Engel and Friedmanembodies the principle of double criminality: the accused's acts must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and requested state. The idea behind this rule
is that Israel will not extradite a person, thereby depriving him of freedom
of movement and freedom to chose the place in which he wishes to live,
unless he is charged with or has been convicted of acts that are also crimes
under Israeli law.
While the acts attributed to the wanted offender must be criminal
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offenses under the laws of both states, they need not necessarily amount
to the same offense under the two jurisdictions. In Ross v. State of Israel, 39
U.S. authorities had charged the appellant with interstate transportation
of a person who had been unlawfully kidnapped. Although Israel has no
direct equivalent to the interstate transport offenses, the acts attributed to
the accused-if committed in Israel-would have amounted to the offense
of wrongfully concealing or confining an abducted person 40 and also to
the offense of receiving or harboring a child unlawfully taken from its
parent. 41 Both of these offenses were felonies under Israeli law and as such
extradition offenses as defined in the Schedule to the Extradition Law.
Therefore, the Court in Ross held that the double criminality requirement
was satisfied.
The rule of double criminality is satisfied even when the Israeli offense
is different by its nature and definition from the offense with which the
accused is charged in the requesting state. In noting that a demand for
complete identity between the criminal offenses in the requesting and the
requested states would deprive extradition treaties of any real effectiveness, the Supreme Court of Israel quoted with approval the following
statement made by Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court
in Collins v. Loisel: 42
The law does not require that the name by which the crime is described in
the two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of liability shall be
coextensive, or, in other respects the same in the two countries. It is enough
3
if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions. 4
Extradition Offense under Law and Treaty
The third condition laid out by the court in Engel and Friedman requires that
the crime with which the fugitive is accused must amount to an extradition
offense both under Israeli law and under the provisions of the relevant
extradition treaty. An extradition offense is defined in the Schedule to the
Extradition Law. It includes all felonies, which in Israel are offenses punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding three years, together with
a number of other offenses set out specifically in the Schedule. These latter
offenses, while not classified as felonies under Israel's criminal law, are
considered sufficiently serious to justify extradition (for example, simple
theft the punishment for which is three years imprisonment).
The extradition treaty itself may restrict the comprehensive list of
offenses set out in the Schedule to the statute. Section 21 provides that
where an extradition treaty stipulates that only a part of the offenses set
out in the Schedule shall be extradition offenses, then that limitation shall
be followed. 44 Thus, for an offense to be extraditable, it must appear both
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in the Schedule to the Extradition Law and in any list of offenses contained
in the treaty.
A recent case illustrates the difficulty of applying this third requirement.
In Attorney General v. Cohen 45 a fugitive from the United States had been
charged in Nevada with committing an act of oral sex with a girl of
fourteen. The double criminality test was satisfied since under Israeli law
such conduct amounted to an indecent act against a minor, one of the
offenses set out in the Schedule to the Extradition Law. This crime did not,
however, appear in the list of offenses set out in the Convention on
Extradition between Israel and the United States. The Convention list
included the crime of unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under age, but
the Jerusalem District Court held that such an offense was limited to sexual
intercourse with a minor and could not be extended to include other forms
of sexual contact. The wanted person could not therefore be extradited on
the oral sex charge. 46
In Engel and Friedman the Supreme Court explained that in determining
whether a particular crime amounts to one of the offenses set out in the
extradition treaty, the court will be guided by two principles. First, a court
need not interpret an international treaty in accordance with the same
criteria by which the court would interpret local criminal legislation. In
particular, there is no need to give terms appearing in the treaty the same
technical and limited meaning that might be attributed to them under local
law. The court should rather aim at realizing the purpose for which the
treaty was signed-international cooperation in the war against crime. 47
Second, the formal name given to a crime in the list of offenses set out
in the extradition treaty is not dispositive as to whether a given offense was
included in the treaty. The test should be practical rather than formal and
mechanistic. The court should consider the basic, essential elements of the
offense rather than the naming technique adopted by the legislature.
Engel and Friedman demonstrates the proper application of these principles. There, the appellants were wanted in Canada on a charge of rape. The
victim's consent to the intercourse had been obtained by threats and intimidation.
The status of this offense was complicated because Israel's criminal law
regarding rape contains two separate offenses which in other jurisdictions
might be treated as one. Unlawful sexual intercourse against the will of a
woman by use of force is punishable by fourteen years imprisonment and
is known as rape. 48 Where the victim has consented to the intercourse but
that consent has been induced by deception or by threats, the perpetrator
is subject to ten years imprisonment and the offense is referred to by the
49
generic name of "rape by deception."
The list of offenses in the Israel-Canada extradition agreement referred
simply to rape. 50 The appellants therefore argued that only unlawful
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intercourse by force (the first of the two Israeli offenses) could amount to
rape within the meaning of the treaty. Those who drafted the extradition
treaty presumably knew the distinction made by Israeli law between the
two offenses. Had they intended to include "rape by deception" they
would have said so specifically.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument. In its view the formal
name given to the offense was not dispositive. The courts must examine
the offenses listed in the treaty by reference to their essential elements. The
essence of rape is unlawful intercourse with a woman against her wish.
Whether her consent is negatived by force or merely by threats is immaterial. Both forms of conduct amount to the generic offense of rape. The
fact that the crime had been divided by Israel's penal law into two separate
offenses was a matter of legislative convenience and could not affect the
essence of the crime. Therefore, the Court held that conduct that would
be classified under Israeli law as rape by deception was nevertheless rape
within the meaning of the extradition treaty.
Death Penalty
Section 16 of the Extradition Law provides that a wanted person shall not
be extradited for an offense punishable by death in the requesting state,
but not so punishable in Israel, unless the requesting state agrees not to
impose the death penalty and to commute any death penalty that has been
or may be imposed. In Israel the offense of murder is not punishable by
death but by imprisonment for life. 51 Any country in which the death
penalty still remains a possible punishment for murder would have to
undertake that this penalty would not be imposed or carried out before a
fugitive wanted for murder could be extradited from Israel.
Place of Commission
The Extradition Law allows the extradition of a person charged or convicted in the requesting state of an extradition offense without stipulating
where that crime must have been committed. Where the courts of the
requesting state have extraterritorial jurisdiction, there would seem to be
no bar to the extradition from Israel of an offender charged in the requesting state with the commission of an offense in a third country. 52 However,
Israeli courts have not yet encountered requests for extradition from Israel
with respect to offenses committed outside the territory of the requesting
state. 3
Political Offense
Under section 2(2) of the Extradition Law, only "an offense of a nonpolitical character" can be considered an extradition offense. Israel will not
entertain a request for the extradition of a person charged with a political
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offense. The Minister of Justice is not even empowered to order such a
person brought before a District Court to determine whether he is subject
to extradition. In addition, section 10 provides that a District Court considering an extradition petition shall not declare the wanted person subject
to extradition, if it finds that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation or the request for extradition arises from racial or
religious discrimination, or that the request for extradition aims at prosecuting or punishing the wanted person for an offense of a political character, even though on its face the request is not made in connection with such
an offense.
Section 2 of the statute relates to the pure political offense, an offense
which by its very nature is political, such as sedition. The initial decision
as to whether a particular offense is of a political character is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice, since he is authorized to order the filing
of an extradition petition only with respect to a non-political offense. His
decision in this matter could also be challenged before the court, since
before declaring a person subject to extradition, the court must be satisfied
that all the conditions of the statute have been complied with, and the
non-political character of the offense is one of these conditions.
Section 10(2) of the Extradition Law refers to the relative political
offense. An act that on its face amounts to an ordinary crime may be
committed in circumstances which change it into a political offense. The
question as to whether the connection with political events is sufficiently
close to convert the crime into a political offense is a matter to be decided
by the courts. Although this kind of problem has occupied the courts of
many countries, it has not yet arisen before the courts of Israel. 54
As to the pure political offense-the burden of proving the issue appears
to be on the prosecution to show that the offense in question is not
political, since this is a condition precedent to the filing of an extradition
petition. As to the relative political offense-the burden appears to be on
the defense, since the court will dismiss an extradition petition because of
the political offense exception only if it is satisfied that the wanted person
is to be prosecuted for an offense of a political character despite the nonpolitical nature of the crime itself.
Arrest and Detention
The extradition process usually begins when the Interpol Unit at Israel
Police Headquarters receives a request telegraphed from a foreign police
force for the preliminary arrest of a fugitive offender. The Interpol Unit
consults with the International Section of the State Attorney's Department, in order to ensure that there is a proper legal basis for initiating
extradition proceedings against the wanted person. 55 The Interpol Unit
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then instructs the appropriate unit of the Israel police to locate and arrest
the wanted person.
Once the police have found the wanted person, a senior police officer
may order his arrest provided that there is reason to believe that the
wanted person is subject to extradition, that the requesting state will
submit a formal request for his extradition, and that detention is necessary
to ensure the suspect's eventual extradition. 56 To satisfy these conditions
for arrest, the crimes attributed to the wanted person must be set out in
detail in the request and the requesting state must clearly agree to ask for
the fugitive's extradition.
The police must bring a person arrested pursuant to such a request
before a Magistrates Court within forty-eight hours. 57 It is customary for
him to appear in court within twenty-four hours of his arrest. The magistrate may, at his discretion, order the requested person to be held in
custody for any period not exceeding fifteen days. 58 The magistrate may
also order the wanted person's release on bail, on such conditions as he sees
fit, or discharge him unconditionally. If the wanted person is charged with
a non-violent crime and the court concludes that there is no real danger
of his fleeing from Israel, the court will often order his release on bail. To
assure that the wanted person will appear in court when requested, the
magistrate may require him to deposit substantial securities, to hand over
his passports or other travel documents and to present himself at fixed
intervals at the local police station.
Where a judge of the Magistrate's Court orders the wanted person to
be released on bail, the conditions of bail will remain in force for a period
of 180 days. 59 Release of the suspect on bail or even his absolute discharge
from custody do not prevent the later consideration of a formal request for
his extradition.
If the wanted person has not been released on bail, and if the circumstances so warrant, the Magistrate may extend the wanted person's arrest
for an additional period of fifteen days. 60 If the filing of an extradition
petition has been delayed, the Attorney General may file a special application requesting a longer period of detention. The Magistrate may then
continue the wanted person's arrest for additional periods of fifteen
days. 61 Under no circumstances can the wanted person be detained for a
total period of more than sixty days prior to the filing of the extradition
petition with the District Court. 62
The position of a wanted person arrested at the request of a foreign state
is similar to that of a person suspected of committing a crime in Israel. Both
the detainee and the prosecution have an automatic right of appeal to the
District Court against the magistrate's decision and from the District Court
a further appeal is possible before one judge of the Supreme Court. 63
Once the Attorney General's representative files the extradition peti-

186

TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

tion, the District Court may order the wanted person to be detained in
custody until the termination of the proceedings. 64 When considering an
application for the detention of a wanted person, the court will take into
account the usual considerations relevant to the detention or release on bail
of an accused person (for example, the seriousness of the offense). In
addition to these factors, the courts will also consider the additional element of Israel's treaty obligation to deliver the wanted person to the
requesting state if and when that person is finally declared subject to
extradition.
State of Israel v. Pollack 65 highlights the factors involved in a decision to
grant bail after the filing of the extradition petition. There, charges of
larceny and fraud were pending against the respondent in Massachusetts.
The District Court of Tel Aviv had declared the respondent subject to
extradition but had ordered him released on bail pending the hearing of
his appeal to the Supreme Court. The District Court felt that under the
circumstances it was not likely that the respondent would try to flee from
Israel. The State of Israel appealed against the respondent's release on bail
and the President of the Supreme Court ordered the respondent to be
returned to custody.
The President of the Supreme Court noted that Israel's obligations
under the extradition treaty with the United States require extra caution
regarding the release on bail of a person wanted for extradition. The State
of Israel must be able to honor its obligation to the requesting state and
hand over the wanted person if and when he is finally declared extraditable. This does not mean that the District Court will never release a person
declared subject to extradition pending the outcome of his appeal. The
Court will however grant a request for release on bail only in exceptional
circumstances. In Pollack, the Court found the fact that the requested person
was sixty-one years of age and had a completely unblemished past did not
amount to such a reason for his release on bail. 66
The Pollack decision was followed by Justice Barak of Israel's Supreme
Court in the case of Orenstein v. State of Israel. 67 In that case the appellant
had been convicted in Canada for drug offenses and sentenced to a long
prison term. The Canadian Court of Appeal released him on bail pending
his appeal. Following his flight to Israel the Canadian Government asked
that Israel either return him to Canada or require him to serve the Canadian
prison sentence in Israel. The District Court of Tel Aviv ordered him
detained in custody pending the outcome of the proceedings against him.
In his appeal against this decision, the appellant argued that the Israeli
courts should not be stricter than the Canadian Court of Appeal and that
his client should be freed on bail pending the outcome of the case.
In dismissing his appeal, Justice Barak attempted to define the tests that
an Israeli court should apply when considering how to exercise its powers
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of arrest under the Extradition Law. In Justice Barak's view, the court is
required to take into account the special nature and purpose of extradition
proceedings. Thus, sometimes it would be proper to detain a requested
person in custody even though, under the usual rules pertaining to a
suspect brought before the courts in Israel, it would be proper to release
him.
In addition to the usual grounds for ordering a person to be detained
in custody, the Court must consider the State of Israel's obligation under
the extradition treaty. This does not mean that the Court will ignore a
wanted person's fundamental right to liberty. Depriving a person of his
freedom is a most serious matter, even where he is wanted for extradition.
The Court must weigh the wanted person's right to freedom against the
danger that the State of Israel might not be able to honor its treaty obligation if the wanted person is allowed to go free while the proceedings are
pending against him. This latter consideration, while appropriate to all
stages of the extradition process, gathers greater force as the proceedings
move toward their conclusion and a final finding that the wanted person
is subject to extradition.
The Evidence Required
Under section 9 of the Extradition Law, the Attorney General's representative must satisfy the court hearing an extradition petition that there is
sufficient evidence to justify committing the wanted person for trial in
Israel had he committed the acts complained of in this country. The court
must therefore consider the evidence against the fugitive before it can
order his extradition.
The Extradition Law does not prescribe what formal test the courts
should use in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. When the Extradition Law was enacted in 1954, a preliminary enquiry procedure was in
operation in Israel in connection with the trial of the more serious
offenses. 68 Under this procedure, a magistrate would hear the prosecution
witnesses, explain the nature of the charge to the accused and consider any
statement made by the accused and any witnesses he might wish to call
at that stage. At the conclusion of his enquiry, the magistrate had to decide
whether or not there was sufficient credible evidence to justify bringing the
accused to trial. When the legislature enacted the Extradition Law it probably intended a test similar to that applied by a magistrate at a preliminary
enquiry.
Preliminary enquiry by a magistrate was, however, later abolished. 69
Under present day criminal procedure, the results of a police investigation
into a felony are forwarded to the District Attorney and it is he who must
decide whether there is sufficient evidence to justify bringing the accused
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to trial. 70 It could therefore be said that today the evidence test in an
extradition case should be whether the evidence supplied by the requesting state would persuade a reasonable District Attorney to file an indictment against the wanted person had the crime been committed in Israel.
While the Supreme Court of Israel has not formally adopted either of
these tests, it has interpreted the evidence requirement in more general
terms. In Kamiar v. State of Israel, 71 the Court explained that a decision that
the evidence is sufficient for extradition means only that the material
justifies the hearing of the charge against the accused. Such a decision does
not amount to an expression of the court's opinion that the evidence, if
uncontradicted, is sufficient to convict the accused. The extradition court
in Israel will not take a stand regarding the preference of one piece of
evidence over another and will not consider credibility unless the evidence
appears on its face to be wholly worthless. 72
Although a court hearing an extradition petition will not examine the
evidence against the wanted person in great detail, it must be satisfied that
the evidence would be admissible in a court in Israel trying the case against
the accused. Hearsay evidence cannot therefore be relied upon, since it is
not admissible under Israel's rules of evidence. Nor, for example, could the
case against the wanted person be based on statements made by his spouse,
parent or child since such evidence is not admissable under Israeli law
except in the case of crimes of physical violence. 73
There is one exception to the rule that evidence must be admissible in
a domestic criminal case in order to be admissible in an extradition hearing.
In a criminal trial in Israel all witnesses must normally appear before the
court to give their evidence from the witness box and to be cross-examined
by counsel for the opposing side. Obviously, this is not possible in an
extradition case. Section 12(2) of the Extradition Law therefore provides
that a court dealing with an extradition petition shall not reject any document or testimony designated in an agreement between Israel and the
requesting state as admissible in evidence for the purpose of extradition.
The extradition treaties to which Israel is a party provide that evidence
taken in the requesting state in the manner prescribed by the treaty (for
example, before a judge or official of the requesting state) and duly authenticated shall be admitted into evidence in the examination of the request
for extradition. In this way, written depositions and witness statements
made abroad may be admissible in an extradition hearing in Israel. 74
Under the rules of evidence applicable to a criminal trial in Israel, certain
evidence must be corroborated if it is to serve as a basis for conviction. The
most common forms of evidence requiring corroboration are the testimony
of a complainant in a sexual offense and the evidence in any criminal case
of an accomplice to the crime. In Israel, there can be no conviction without
corroboration.
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The issue of corroboration arose in Engel and Friedman v. State of Israel, 75
where the wanted fugitives had been charged in Canada with sexual
offenses. They argued that the evidence of the complainant was not corroborated and that therefore the evidence was insufficient to comnit them
for trial in Israel had the alleged sexual offenses been committed here. The
Supreme Court of Israel found that absence of corroboration did not prevent the appellants from being declared subject to extradition. It based its
conclusion in this matter on the nature of corroboration on the one hand
and on the nature of an extradition hearing on the other.
As to corroboration, experience has shown that certain types of evidence are not sufficiently reliable to serve as the sole basis for a conviction.
The law therefore requires corroboration. Corroboration must be evidence
from an independent source relating to an essential point at issue between
prosecution and accused. It must strengthen the prosecution's evidence by
being inconsistent with the accused's version of the facts. Lies made by the
accused on a material point at issue and, following a 1976 amendment, 76
the accused's unwillingness to give evidence may both amount to corroboration. Therefore, a court can decide whether the corroboration requirement has been fulfilled only immediately prior to judgment. It may well
be that a prosecutor will not commence proceedings unless he knows in
advance that there exists some corroborative evidence. This, however, is
a matter of prosecution policy and does not mean at law that without
corroboration there is insufficient evidence to commit an accused for trial.
On the other hand, the purpose of an extradition hearing is to determine
whether there is evidence which is not altogether worthless and which
would justify committing the wanted person for trial. Such a hearing ends
at the point where an ordinary criminal trial begins and precedes the stage
at which corroboration must be considered. Prima facie corroboration does
not, therefore, have to be shown in an extradition case. The purpose of
section 9 of the Extradition Law is to prevent extradition where the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to commit the wanted person for
trial. It is not the purpose of section 9 to prevent extradition where the
evidence is sufficient for committal but the prospect of an actual conviction
is in doubt because of uncertainty as to whether the corroboration requirement is going to be met. The Supreme Court therefore decided in Engel and
Friedman that even in the absence of any corroborating evidence the appellants could be declared extraditable to Canada in order to stand trial there
on sexual offenses.
Rule of Specialty
Section 17 of the Extradition Law provides that Israeli authorities may not
extradite a person unless it has been ensured, by agreement with the
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requesting state that he will not be detained, tried or punished in that
country for any offense committed prior to his extradition other than the
one for which extradition has been requested. This provision embodies the
rule of specialty. 77
Cowen v. State of Israel 78 required strict compliance with the rule. There,
the Republic of South Africa had requested the appellant's extradition in
order to bring him to trial on charges of stealing trust money. The extradition treaty between Israel and South Africa 79 contained no provision
regarding the rule of specialty, despite the fact that an undertaking to act
in accordance with this rule was required by section 17 of the Extradition
Law and was in fact included in every other extradition agreement to
which the State of Israel was a party. Since the conditions of section 17
had not been fulfilled, the Supreme Court of Israel found that the wanted
offender could not be extradited.
Under section 2 of the South African treaty, each country agreed to
extradite fugitive offenders subject to its law of extradition. Section 19 of
South Africa's Extradition Act of 1962 80 provided that no person extradited to that country should be detained or tried for an offense committed
prior to his surrender other than for the offense with respect to which
extradition was sought. The Attorney General's representative argued
before the Supreme Court that section 2 of the treaty combined with
section 19 of the South African law were sufficient to ensure compliance
with the requirement of section 17. The Supreme Court held, however,
that it was not sufficient that the specialty rule be enshrined in the domestic law of the requesting state. Section 17 requires that it be guaranteed by
an obligation on the international level-i.e., by a clause in the extradition
treaty itself.
The Court also rejected the argument that section 2 of the treaty incorporated section 19 of the South African law into the treaty itself. All that
section 2 meant was that the Republic of South Africa could extradite a
fugitive from its shores only according to its own internal extradition laws.
It did not comprise any undertaking as to what was to be done with a
person extradited to South Africa from Israel.
The Court's conclusion was given extra weight in view of the difference
between section 17 of the Extradition Law and section 7(b) of the Extradition Ordinance s' that had preceded it. Under the provisions of the ordinance the requesting state could satisfy the specialty requirement in one
of two ways: either by an undertaking in the treaty or by a provision in
its laws. The Extradition Law, however, requires that compliance with the
specialty rule be ensured by agreement with the requesting state. In the
absence of such agreement, there can be no extradition.
Finally, the Supreme Court would not accept the argument that the
undertaking did not have to be expressly spelled out, since the rule of
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specialty was a recognized and accepted principle of international law and
could therefore be regarded as an implied term of the agreement. The
Court found that although it was customary for most countries to act, in
one form or another, in accordance with the specialty rule, its scope was
not yet clearly defined as a rule of international law and it could differ from
state to state. Moreover, the Israeli legislature preferred not to rely on
general international practice in this matter, but to insist on an undertaking
being set out in the extradition agreement. 82
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the specialty clause in the
extradition agreement between Israel and France. 83 That agreement provides that a person extradited from one country to the other should not
be "tried in his presence" for an offense other than the one for which he
was extradited. In Azen v. State of Israel, 84 the appellant argued that this
clause did not satisfy the requirements of section 17 since an extradited
person could still be tried in his absence for an offense other than the one
for which he was extradited. In dismissing this agrument, the Supreme
Court of Israel noted that the words "tried in his presence" only serve to
emphasize what is in any case taken for granted: that the rule of specialty
has nothing to do with the trial of a person in his absence, since for such
a trial there is no need for extradition proceedings. Thus, the phrase "he
shall not be tried for another offense committed prior to his extradition"
in section 17 of the Extradition Law refers to a trial which the accused is
compelled to attend in person and not to any proceeding held in his
absence.
The rule of specialty was again a focus of argument in Hanauer v. State
of Israel. 85 The appellant in that case did not deny that the undertaking
required by section 17 appeared in the Israel-United Kingdom extradition
treaty. He argued, however, that this was not sufficient since-under sec87
tion 19 of the English Extradition Act of 1870 86 and English case law
-the courts in England could try an extradited person for offenses other
than those for which he was extradited, provided that the other offenses
were based on the facts which served as grounds for extradition.
The Court did not find it necessary to decide whether this state of affairs
conflicted with the rule of specialty as set out in section 17 of the Extradition Law. All that the Court required under this section was that its
conditions be guaranteed by treaty. This guarantee was contained in Article 7 of the Israel-United Kingdom extradition agreement. It is not, therefore, the duty of the court to enquire whether the internal law of the
requesting state and the way that law is interpreted by its courts does in
fact ensure conformity with the treaty obligation assumed by that state.
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Prescription by Lapse of Time
The court must dismiss an extradition petition if-due to a lapse of timethe offense is no longer subject to prosecution or the punishment imposed
is no longer enforceable either under the law of the requesting state or
under the law of Israel. 88 As to the law of the requesting state, a request
for extradition usually includes a statement setting out the law of prescription in that state to indicate that the offense or punishment have not
become barred by statute. 89
As to Israeli law, section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Law of 1965
provides that a person shall not be brought to trial for a felony if ten years
have elapsed since the date of the commission of the crime. 90 Where,
however, an investigation has been carried out pursuant to statute or
where a complaint has been filed or where court proceedings have begun,
then the period of prescription will begin only from the date of such
action. 91 The question arises as to whether actions taken in the requesting
state can interrupt the prescription period of Israeli law. The courts have
never considered the issue. The Criminal Procedure Law does recognize
that certain actions showing that the case is being pursued will suffice to
break the flow of time for prescription purposes. In an extradition case,
these actions will normally have been taken in the country where the crime
was committed (in the requesting state). With regard to an extradition
request based on that crime, it follows that the Israeli courts should construe such actions as interrupting the prescription period of Israeli law.
The Minister's Discretion
Extradition is a combined judicial and executive process, with the executive function being exercised by the Minister of Justice. The Minister must
exercise his powers at two separate stages: at the very beginning of the case
and at the very end.
No extradition case can commence unless the Minister of Justice directs
that the wanted person be brought before a District Court in order to
determine whether he is subject to extradition. 92 The Minister might
refrain from giving such an instruction if, for example, relations between
Israel and the requesting state were rapidly deteriorating, if it was clear
that the acts complained of in the requesting state did not amount to an
extradition offense under Israeli law, or if the requesting state had not
furnished evidence that could possibly justify committing the accused
person for trial. He could also take into account relevant personal consideration (for example, when the wanted person had been injured in an accident in Israel and was completely crippled).
In Lipski v. Minister of Justice, 93 the Supreme Court of Israel emphasized
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the wide discretion afforded the Minister under section 3 of the Extradition
Law. First and foremost, the Minister must satisfy himself, on the strength
of the material presented by the foreign state, that the conditions set out
in section 2 of the statute are fulfilled: that there exists an extradition treaty
between the requesting state and the State of Israel providing for reciprocity in the extradition of offenders and that the person whose extradition
is sought has been accused or convicted, in the requesting state, of an
offense of a non-political character that is an extradition offense as defined
in the schedule to the Extradition Law. Thereafter the Minister may take
into account all other relevant considerations for and against commencing
extradition proceedings.
The Minister may-but is not obliged to-consider allegations that the
requested person could raise before the court hearing the extradition petition. For example, section 10 of the Extradition Law requires the court to
dismiss the petition if it finds that there are reasonable grounds for assuming that the accusation or the request for extradition arises from racial or
religious discrimination. At the preliminary stage the Minister does not
have to consider any such argument raised by the wanted person and may
leave the matter to the court. However, the Minister could use the discretion afforded him by section 3 and refuse to order the commencement of
extradition proceedings on the same grounds as those set out in section 10.
Following a final determination by the courts that the wanted person
is subject to extradition, the matter returns to the executive arm of the
government. Under section 18, the Minister of Justice must then decide
whether or not to order the extradition. Section 18 states merely that the
Minister may order execution of the extradition. His discretion in this
matter is nowhere defined.
The Minister of Justice will, of course, be aware that refusal to grant his
order may put Israel in breach of her treaty commitments. It would also
lead to an undesirable clash with the judicial branch were the Minister to
base his decision on a conclusion opposite to that reached by the courts.
On the other hand, the Minister is certainly entitled to take into account
matters that would not affect a court's decision. For example, the Minister
could consider the state of the wanted person's health, the fact that he had
made no personal profit from the commission of the offense, or any excessive and unreasonable delay on the part of the requesting state in submitting the request for extradition. 94
Once the courts have found that a wanted person is subject to extradition, the Minister generally will order implementation of the extradition.
In recent years there have been two cases in which the Minister exercised
his discretion against execution of the extradition despite the fact that the
Supreme Court of Israel had decided that the wanted person could be
extradited. 95
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In one case the Minister had to decide whether to order the extradition
of an Israeli national. At the date that the matter came before the Minister,
Israel's Parliament had already passed on first reading a bill prohibiting the
extradition of an Israeli national. Although this bill had not yet passed into
law, the Minister found that he could not disregard the clearly expressed
wish of the legislature and therefore refrained from ordering the implementation of the extradition.
In the second case, the Minister took into account the wanted person's
declining state of health. He noted the comment made by the extradition
court that the wanted person had acted out of a misguided sense of loyalty
and not in order to achieve any direct, monetary gain. He also considered
the fact that the wanted person had not fled to Israel in order to avoid
apprehension but had settled here to realize a long standing plan to make
his home in this country. Extradition proceedings were commenced against
the accused long after his arrival in Israel. Exercising the absolute discretion given to him under section 18 of the Extradition Law, the Minister
decided, on essentially humanitarian grounds, not to order extradition.
THE LAW OF RETURN AND THE EXTRADITION
OF THE ISRAELI NATIONAL
The Law of Return
To suppress crime, the State of Israel seeks full co-operation with other
countries. It has no wish to become a country of refuge for criminals
seeking to escape justice. However, the State of Israel exists as a homeland
for the Jews of the world, so special care will be taken before a person is
uprooted from Israel and handed over to a foreign state. The law of extradition from Israel must therefore be seen against the background of the
concept that every Jew has a legal right to settle in this country.
The idea of the return of the Jews to the land of Israel is a basic tenet
of the Jewish faith and a key theme in the ideology of the State. 96 This
concept of a state always open for Jewish immigration found practical
legislative expression in the 1950 Law of Return, 97 which lays down the
basic principle that "every Jew has the right to come to this couritry as an
immigrant." Under the statute, an immigrant's visa must be granted to
every Jew who has expressed his desire to settle permanently in Israel. Not
only does the immigrant under the Law of Return have the legal right to
enter and settle in Israel, he also immediately and automatically acquires
Israeli nationality. The general principle embodied in the Nationality Law
of 1952 98 is that "every immigrant under the Law of Return shall become
an Israeli national."
Israel's short history has given full practical effect to these legal princi-
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ples and Israel has become a country of immigration "par excellence."
Today, over 40 percent of the Jewish population of the state are immigrants: former foreign nationals or stateless refugees who settled in Israel
and acquired Israeli nationality by return. 99 The Government of Israel
cannot restrict the number or human quality of the Jewish immigrants
coming to Israel and is bound to accept all those who answer the invitation
extended to the Jews of the world by the Law of Return. Occasionally,
fugitive offenders are among those taking advantage of this sweeping right
of immigration and automatic grant of Israeli nationality. The legislature
and courts in Israel have therefore faced the problem of how to preserve
the fundamental right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel without permitting this right to be abused by fugitives from justice.
The possibility of refusing entry to the prospective Jewish immigrant is
strictly limited. The Law of Return does authorize the Minister of the
Interior to refuse an immigrant's visa to a person with a criminal past likely
to endanger public welfare, 100 but this power can be used only sparingly.
The Minister's power is also limited because it will not solve the problem
of the Jew charged with a serious offense in his country of origin who flees
to Israel before he can be brought to trial. It is arguably unreasonable to
allow the fugitive to exploit the lack of a conviction in order to ensure his
acceptance as an immigrant under the Law of Return. Yet, the majority
view is that the principle that a man is innocent until proven guilty should
also apply to the Minister of the Interior's decision regarding refusal of an
immigrant's visa. In the absence of a conviction (or a dear and voluntary
admission by the would-be immigrant that he had indeed committed a
serious offense in his country of origin), the Minister could not regard him
as a person with a criminal past. An unconvicted person cannot therefore
be deprived of his fundamental right to settle in Israel. 101
Even if the Minister were able to use his power to refuse an immigrant's
visa, it would not ensure the wanted person's return to his country of
origin. The Minister could only refuse the would-be immigrant the right
to settle in Israel. But he would be free to travel to any other country in
the world that was prepared to accept him. Moreover, a fugitive offender
may come to Israel, acquire the status of an immigrant under the Law of
Return and be granted Israeli nationality before anything is known of the
fact that he is fleeing from justice. In these cases extradition is the only way
in which the fugitive offender can be made to return to his country of
origin in order to stand trial.
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Extradition of a National
Law Prior to 1978

Prior to 1978, Israeli law did not restrict the extradition of an Israeli
national. The Extradition Law did not mention naticnality, referring only
to the wanted person. Indeed the State of Israel had concluded an extradition treaty with the United States which provided specifically that extradition would not be refused on the ground that the wanted person was a
national of the requested state. 102
In 1977 the question of extraditing an Israeli national was considered by
the Supreme Court of Israel in Pesachovitch v. State of Israel. 103 The appellant

was an Israeli national, charged in Switzerland with forgery and fraud.
Extradition relations between Israel and Switzerland were regulated by the
European Convention on Extradition. 104 Article 6(1)(a) of the Convention
gives each contracting party "the right to refuse extradition of its nationals," and, under Swiss law, a Swiss national may not be extradited. The
appellant argued that since Switzerland would never extradite a Swiss
national, it would be a breach of the principle of reciprocity were the court
to declare an Israeli national extraditable to Switzerland.
The Court noted that Article 6(2) of the Convention provided that "if
the requested Party does not extradite its national, it shall, at the request
of the requesting party, submit the case to its competent authorities in
order that proceedings may be taken if they are considered appropriate."
Under Swiss law, a Swiss national could be prosecuted for offenses outside
Switzerland. Thus, although there was no formal reciprocity in the extradition relations between Israel and Switzerland, the Supreme Court held that
there was substantive reciprocity. Prosecution of a national for offenses
committed abroad was a proper alternative to his extradition, since both
achieved the aim of bringing the offender to trial. Reciprocity meant twoway traffic but it was not necessary that the traffic in each direction be
absolutely identical. Prosecution of a national was equivalent to his extradition, and the Convention was therefore reciprocal. There was, therefore,
no legal bar to the appellant's extradition.
The Offenses Committed Abroad
(Amendment of Enactments) Law of 1978

The Pesachovitch case attracted much publicity. Legislators proposed various
amendments to the existing statute and finally enacted the Offenses Committed Abroad Law of 1978.105 This statute laid down the general principal that an Israeli national shall not be extradited. Bearing in mind,
however, the special nature of the State of Israel as a country for Jewish
immigration and the ease by which Israeli nationality by return is acquired,
it is still possible to extradite an Israeli national for an offense committed

EXTRADITION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

197

prior to the acquisition of his nationality. 106 Thus a longtime national who
goes abroad, commits an offense there and returns to Israel, cannot be
extradited. But the principle of non-extradition does not apply to a Jew
from abroad, who commits an offense in his country of residence, flees to
Israel, becomes an immigrant under the Law of Return and acquires Israeli
nationality by return. Such a new national can still be extradited despite
the recent change in the law.
In 1978, after the enactment of the new statute, French authorities
sought the extradition of a Paris shopkeeper charged with stealing gold and
jewels entrusted to him. In the hearing before the Jerusalem District Court,
the wanted person's first line of defense was that he had come to Israel as
a Jewish immigrant under the Law of Return, that he had automatically
acquired Israeli nationality and therefore could not be extradited. The
Jerusalem District Court held that even were it to accept the accused's
argument that he had become an Israeli national, this would not stop his
extradition, since his nationality had been acquired only after the commission of the offense. 107
In Engel and Friedman v. Minister of the Interior, 108 the appellants had been
declared extraditable to Canada. Before the extradition could be implemented, they petitioned the High Court of Justice for an order requiring
the Minister of the Interior to recognize them azs Israeli nationals. They
further alleged that since they were Israeli nationals and had not yet been
convicted they were exempt from extradition. They were aware that the
Offenses Committed Abroad Law prohibited extradition of a national
"save for an offense committed before he became an Israeli national" but
argued that this exception applied only to a person actually convicted of
an offense before he acquired Israeli nationality. The Court dismissed their
petition on other grounds but commented that the interpretation of the
statute proposed by the petitioners seemed devoid of all foundation and
contrary to the legislature's intention. 109
Thus the offender who has acquired Israeli nationality after fleeing to
this country will not be exempt from extradition. Serious problems arise,
however, regarding the fugitive offender who was an Israeli national at the
time of the offense and who cannot now be extradited.
Trial of a National in Israel
So that such a person will not escape trial altogether, the 1978 statute
extended the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Israel. The statute
authorized them to try a national for a criminal act committed abroad,
provided that such act, had it been done in Israel, would have amounted
to one of the offenses for which extradition is permitted. The act must also
amount to an offense under the law of the place of commission and the
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Israeli court must not impose a penalty more severe than that to which the
accused would have been subject had he been tried in the state where the
offense was committed. The statute requires the written consent of the
Attorney General for the filing of an indictment with respect to an offense
committed abroad.
This provision amounts to a very considerable departure from the territorial principle of jurisdiction on which Israeli criminal law is largely
based. Its full potential has yet to be exploited. It is, however, already
apparent that this extended jurisdiction entails serious problems. In Israel
the burden is on the prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense
with which the accused is charged. It can do this only by bringing all the
witnesses to court in order to prove each and every fact set out in the
indictment. An accused can be convicted only after all the witnesses have
appeared in court, given their evidence, and been cross-examined thereon.
Where the offense has been committed abroad, the witnesses are not
likely to be found in Israel. In order to conduct a successful prosecution
in Israel, it would therefore be necessary to bring the witnesses to this
country-a difficult and expensive task. The court in Israel has no power
to subpoena witnesses from abroad in order to compel their attendance.
Even if the witnesses agreed to come to Israel, the cost of bringing them
to this country and accommodating them here would make the prosecution
prohibitively expensive. The duty to ensure the rights of the accused might
also require the State of Israel to bring over from the country in which the
crime had been committed all those defense witnesses whose evidence the
accused wished to adduce.
To solve these problems, the legislature could change the law of evidence so that the testimony taken abroad (in the country where the offense
was committed) might be used at the trial in Israel. 110 Yet, even if the law
of evidence in Israel were changed in this way and the courts empowered
to base their decisions on evidence taken abroad, it is hard to imagine a
judge in Israel convicting a defendant of a serious crime or sentencing him
to a long period of imprisonment without having heard the main prosecution witnesses. The adversary system of trial is a deep-rooted feature of
Israel's legal system. Many criminal cases turn on questions of the credibility of the witnesses. Without seeing them in the witness box and observing
them as they give their evidence, the judge would not be able to decide
between the prosecution's and defense's versions of the facts.
As a result of these difficulties, the unfortunate situation can arise in
which an Israeli national, charged with a serious offense abroad, will escape punishment altogether. On the one hand, he cannot be extradited
because of the provision of the 1978 law. On the other hand, he will not
be prosecuted in Israel because of the practical difficulties involved in
bringing all the witnesses to this country. It is perhaps doubly unfortunate

EXTRADITION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

199

that a principal beneficiary of this state of affairs is likely to be the emigrant from Israel. Such an emigrant may have left this country years ago
and made a new home for himself abroad. He will, however, remain an
Israeli national. Should such an emigrant return to Israel after committing
a crime abroad, he may completely avoid trial and punishment.
Possible Compromise Solution
It is unlikely that the legislature will abandon the principle of nonextradition of Israeli nationals which was introduced only three years ago. One
compromise proposal under study suggests that an Israeli national be
transferred for trial to the country in which the offense was committed,
on condition that immediately after his trial he be returned to Israel. He
would serve any sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him abroad in
an Israeli jail. Israeli authorities could transfer the wanted person for trial
abroad only after an Israeli court had found that he would have been
extraditable but for his nationality. 111
This proposal has a number of advantages. The principle of non-extradition of Israeli nationals would remain. Trial would take place in the most
convenient forum, the country in which the offense was committed. The
authorities in that country have the greatest interest in pursuing the case
and the witnesses and the site of the crime are at hand. The Israeli national
would not, however, be abandoned in a foreign jail. He would be able to
serve any prison sentence in Israel, where the environment is more familiar
to him, where the spoken language is Hebrew and where his family and
friends are close to him.
Sentence in Israel
The legislature has already accepted the principle of enforcing a foreign
penal judgment in the Offenses Committed Abroad Law. The law presently deals with the case of the Israeli national sentenced to prison abroad
who finds his way to Israel before completing his term of sentenceusually by escaping from a foreign jail. In such a case, the Minister of
Justice may order, at the request of the state in which the sentence was
imposed, that the fugitive be required to serve the remainder of his sentence in Israel, as though a final judgment of an Israeli court had imposed
the sentence. Such an order can be given only after a court in Israel has
found that the fugitive would be extraditable but for his Israeli nationality.
In Nurieli v. Minister of Justice, 112 an Israeli national, sentenced in the
United States for drug offenses, escaped from the American penitentiary
and managed to reach Israel. He could not be extradited because of his
Israeli nationality. The High Court of Justice upheld an order of the Minister of Justice, compelling the fugitive to complete-in an Israeli jail-the
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unfinished portion of the five-year prison sentence imposed upon him in
the United States. The court also held that the provisions of the Israeli
Penal Law regarding release on parole (which in some respects are stricter
than their American counterparts) would apply in place of those of the
United States Code. 113
Orenstein v. State of Israel, 114 involved a similar factual setting. An Israeli
national had been convicted in Toronto of importing drugs into Canada
and sentenced there to a long prison term. Pending his appeal, he was
released on bail, but then fled to Israel. The government could not extradite
him because of his Israeli nationality. The Ministry of Justice therefore
initiated proceedings to have the fugitive declared subject to extradition
but for his nationality, so that he could then be compelled to serve the
Canadian prison sentence in Israel. The Supreme Court ordered him held
in custody for the duration of these proceedings. When the fugitive
offender saw that he had not escaped justice by fleeing to Israel and was
likely to serve a long prison sentence in any event he elected to return to
Canada and try his luck in the appeal pending before the Canadian court.
As a result, a difficult question remains unanswered: could a foreign prison
sentence that was not yet final but still subject to an appeal be enforced
in Israel?
Conclusion
The above survey shows how the legislature and the courts in Israel are
wrestling with a number of conflicting principles. On the one hand, there
is the basic right of every Jew to settle in Israel. Allied to this right is a sense
of responsibility for all Israeli nationals and a feeling that Israeli authorities
should deal with nationals and not simply hand them over to the law
enforcement authorities of a foreign state.
On the other hand, the government recognizes that it should not allow
a fugitive offender to abuse these rights and feelings so as to escape from
justice. To this end, extradition is still possible for the person who acquired
his Israeli nationality only after committing a crime abroad. Additionally,
the Israeli courts now have jurisdiction to prosecute a national for offenses
committed abroad. The courts may enforce a foreign penal sentence in
Israel if extradition of the convicted fugitive is not possible because of his
Israeli nationality.
These powers are relatively new and the government has not yet fully
explored their potential. There is room for an improvement of the legislative and judicial mechanisms. The overall aim is, however, clear. Israel
shall seek to cooperate with other states so that the fugitive offender may
eventually be brought to justice.
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NOTES
1 No overall survey of the topic has as yet appeared in the English language. For treatment
in English of specific problems in Israel's extradition law, see Feller, Some New Emphases in
Extradition Case Law, 16 ISRAEL L. REv. 215 (1978); Feller, The Scope of Reciprocity in Extradition, 10
ISRAEL L. RIv. 427 (1975); Feller, The Significance of the Requirement of Double Criminality in the Law
of Extradition,10 ISRAEL L. REv. 51 (1975); Meron, Non-Extraditionof Israeli NationalsandExtraterritoriallurisdiction:Reflections on Bill No. 1306, 13 ISRAEL L. Rsv. 215 (1978); Meron, Israeland the European
ExtraditionSystem, 5 ISRAEL L. REv. 75 (1970); Shachor-Landau, ExtraterritorialPenal jurisdictionand
Extradition, [1980] Ihrr'L & CoMP. L.Q. 274.
2 Extradition Law 1954, §§ 6-7, 8 Laws of the State of Israel [L.S.I.] 144, 145. Laws of the
State of Israel are authorized English translations of Israeli statutes, which are enacted in
Hebrew. The Ministry of Justice prepares the translations.
3 In Israel the District Court is the middle level court in a three-tier structure and serves
as the court of first instance for the trial of serious offenses.
4 Extradition Law, 1954, § 3, 8 L.S.I. 144, 144.
5 Id., § 4, 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
6 Id., § 5, 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
7 Extradition [Procedure and Rules of Evidence on Petitions] Regulations, 1970 (published
in Hebrew only) prescribe the procedure in extradition cases.
8 Extradition Law, 1954, § 9, 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
9 Id., § 13, 8 L.S.I. 144, 146.
10 Id., § 14, 8 L.S.I. 144, 146.
11 Id., § 18, 8 L.S.I. 144, 146.
12 The wanted person must be removed from Israel within sixty days from the day on
which the court's declaration becomes final. The court may, however, extend this period on
the ground that there are special circumstances delaying the carrying out of the extradition.
Id., §§ 19(a), 20, 8 L.S.I. 144, 146-47.
13 The statute was amended and updated by the addition of improved technical provisions in 1956,1965 and 1975. See Extradition (Amendment) Law, 1956,10 L.S.I. 27; Extradition
(Amendment) Law, 1964,19 L.S.I. 186 (amending § 22); Extradition (Amendment No. 3) Law,
1975, 29 L.S.I. 305 (amending § 7). A major change in approach and policy occurred in 1978
with the enactment of the Offenses Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law,
1978, which laid down the new principle that an Israeli national was not to be extradited save
for an offense committed before he became a national.
14 Only one section of the Extradition Law covers a person extradited to Israel. Section
24 provides that a person extradited to Israel by a foreign state shall not be detained or tried
for another offense, or extradited to another state for any offense committed before his
extradition unless that foreign state consents in writing to such an act or he has not left Israel
within sixty days after being given the opportunity to do so. Extradition Law, 1954, § 24,
8 L.S.I. 144, 147.
15 Israel may of course remove people from its borders and territory through procedures
other than extradition. First, when a person reaches Israel but has no right to enter, he may
be refused admission and removed from the borders of the state. Entry into Israel Law, 1952,
§ 10(a), 6 L.S.I. 159, 160. This may lead to his removal to the country in which he boarded
the carrier which brought him to Israel. Second, if a person has succeeded in entering Israel
but has no right to remain in the country (because he lacks a valid permit), the Minister of
the Interior may issue an order for his deportation. Id., § 13(a) 6 L.S.I. 161. Deportation of
a person may lead, in the absence of any other nation willing to accept him, to his forced
return to the country of nationality. Either of these two forms of removal could result in a
kind of de facto extradition if the person concerned were wanted for trial in the country to
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which he was removed. Compare R. v. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex parle Soblen, [1962] 3 All
E.R. 641. This must not, however, be the aim of nonadmittance or deportation. In the absence
of extradition proceedings against him, an unwelcome arrival in Israel should be allowed to
leave for whichever country he chooses provided that country is prepared to accept him.
16 The countries are Belgium, Luxemburg, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, Canada, Swaziland and Australia.
17 The countries covered by the European Convention on Extradition are Austria, Italy,
Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, Greece, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Cyprus, Switzerland and West Germany.
18 E.g., Switzerland, the Netherlands.
19 European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 28, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
20 E.g., West Germany, Cyprus.
21 European Convention on Extradition, supra note 19, art. 1.
22 See Custodian of Absentee Property v. Samara, 10(3) Piske, Din [P.D.] 1825, 1829
(1956); Israel Maccabi Ass'n v. State of Israel, 31(1) P.D. 770, 777 (1977).
23 See, e.g., Extradition Law, 1954, §§ 12, 21, 8 L.S.I. 144, 146, 147, which gave effect to
evidentiary and other provisions of agreements concerning extradition law.
24 Extradition Law, 1954, § 3, 8 L.S.I. 144, 144.
25 In Hebrew "ne'esham." The word might also be translated as "accused."
26 In Hebrew "Hashood."
27 30(2) P.D. 701 (1976).
28 19 L.S.I. 158.
29 33(3) P.D. 113 (1979).
30 See Agreement for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, April 4, 1960, United
Kingdom-Israel, 11 Israel Treaties 65, 377 U.N.T.S. 331.
31 Under the Criminal Procedure Law, a suspect has been charged only after an information containing the specified facts has been filed against him. See Criminal Procedure Law,
1965, § 75, 19 L.S.I. 158, 167.
32 Support for this view is to be found in a Supreme Court decision of 1952, in which
section 133(a) of the Criminal Code Ordinance was interpreted. That section prescribed a
special penalty for a person who escaped from lawful custody "if he is charged with, or has
been convicted of, a felony." In Kapon v. Allorney General, the appellant was convicted of this
offense even though at the time of his escape from custody, no indictment had been filed
against him. In dismissing his appeal the Supreme Court refused to accept his argument that
a person could not be convicted of an offense under section 133(a) unless it was proved that
he had escaped after an indictment for felony had been filed against him. In the Court's view,
the word charged also extended to the case of a person who had been accused of a felony
at the police station.
33 Extradition Law, 1954, § 9, 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
34 Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, § 116, 19 L.S.I. 173.
35
See, 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1117 (1963), for examples of the ways
other jurisdictions have decided this issue.
36 Ch. 56, 1 Laws of Palestine [L.P.] 677.
37 "[A] person may be extradited if... (2) he is charged or has been convicted in the
requesting state of an offense of a non-political character which, had it been committed in
Israel, would be one of the offenses set out in the Schedule of this Law." Extradition Law,
1954, § 2, 8 L.S.I. 144, 144.
38 34(3) P.D. 98 (1980).
39 27(2) P.D. 365 (1973).
40 This is an offense under Penal Law, 1977, § 375, L.S.I. (Special Volume) 1, 97.
41 This is an offense under Penal Law, 1977, § 367, L.S.I. (Special Volume) 1, 96.
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42 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
43 Id. at 312. For the purpose of the double criminality rule, the different names given by
the legal systems of the two states to the acts complained of or the different ways in which
the two systems classify the offense are of no significance. In Ross, 27(2) P.D. 365, it was held
that ". . . full identity or complete overlapping of the offenses under the laws of the two
countries is not required." In Attorney General v. Dov Cohen, Misc. App. 869/76 (unpublished), a former assistant city engineer of an American town was charged in the United States
with extorting money from contractors who performed road works for the city. It was
doubtful whether the acts attributed to the respondent could amount to extortion under Israel
law. The Tel Aviv District Court held that it was sufficient if the acts amounted, under Israel
law, to the offense of bribery. In fact, the court found that the evidence was not sufficient
to make out a prima facie case for either of the offenses.
44 This is the exceptional case in which the treaty provision takes precedence over the
Extradition Law, but it does so only because the statute itself so provides. Extradition Law,
1954, § 21, 8 L.S.I. 144, 147.
45 Misc. App. 369/80 (unpublished).
46 The court did find the accused extraditable on another charge of intercourse with a
minor.
47 "The offenses listed in a treaty are not in general expressed in exact and specific
language but rather in a comprehensive and generic sense. They should not be interpreted
subject to the fine or nice distinctions of the law of either country. This is in accord with the
principle that treaties should receive a fair and liberal meaning, and that in extradition matters
the ordinary technical rules of criminal law should only apply to a limited extent." G.
LAFOREsr, EXTRADMON TO AND FROM CANADA 57 (1977).

48 Penal Law, 1977, § 345, L.S.I. (Special Volume) 1, 91.
49 Penal Law, 1977, § 346, L.S.I. (Special Volume) 1, 91.
50 Extradition Agreement, March 10, 1967, Canada-Israel, schedule, art. I. 21 Israel Treaties [I.T.] 367, 722 U.N.T.S. 284.
51 Penal Law, 1977, 32 L.S.I. Under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law,
1950, 4 L.S.I. 154, a person who, during the Nazi regime in Europe committed crimes against
the Jewish people, crimes against humanity or war crimes is subject in Israel to the death
penalty. Were such a person to be found in Israel he could be prosecuted here since under
the above law the courts in Israel have jurisdiction to try such offenses wherever and
whenever committed. Thus the question of the extradition of a person liable under Israel law
to this death penalty is not likely to arise.
52 Sometimes the extradition treaty will refer to the place in which the offense was
committed. See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10,1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T.
1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476, 13 I.T. 795, which lays down in article 1 the general principle that
extradition be granted in respect of offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the requesting state. This general rule is subject to paragraph I of Article 3, which provides
that when the offense has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting
party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws of the requested party provide for the
punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances.
53 The State of Israel has on several occasions asked for the extradition of offenders who
committed crimes against Israeli nationals or Jewish persons outside the territory of Israel.
Thus, in 1977, Israel asked for the preliminary arrest pending extradition of Abu Daoud, the
PLO terrorist who allegedly masterminded the murder of the Israel athletes at the Munich
Olympic games. Israel's request was rejected by France on the ground that at the date of the
commission of the offense, France had no such extra-territorial jurisdiction and that the
necessary condition of reciprocity was not therefore fulfilled.
In 1978, the State of Israel asked Holland for the extradition of Nazi war criminal Peter
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Menten, who was accused of participating in the mass murder of the Jewish inhabitants of
two villages in Poland during the Second World War. The request was refused on the ground
of Menten's Dutch nationality. Menten was, however, subsequently convicted on one of the
charges by the courts of Holland and sentenced to a long prison term.
54 See, e.g., In re Abu Eain, No. 7917 175 (slip opinion)(1979), aff'd sub noma.
Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981). This case involved a request by Israel for the extradition of a
PLO terrorist charged with placing a bomb in a trash bin in the crowded market area of the
town of Tiberias, Israel. In the resulting explosion, two youths were killed and thirty-six
passersby were seriously injured. Extradition was requested in order that the wanted offender
be tried for murder, attempted murder and causing bodily harm in aggravating circumstances.
The fugitive argued, inter alia, that there existed a state of military and political conflict
between the Government of Israel and what he termed the people of Palestine and that the
bombing was a political act aimed at weakening the Government of Israel.
In rejecting the political defense argument, the United States courts found that the bombing was an act of terrorism pure and simple. It involved indiscriminate violence not directed
against any arm of government but against innocent civilians. Whatever the perpetrator's
motive, the act complained of was a common crime for which extradition would be granted.
There was probable cause for believing that the wanted offender had committed a random
bombing intended to result in the cold blooded murder of civilians. In these circumstances,
he could not be considered as charged with a political offense and could not benefit from the
political offense exemption from extradition.
55 The kind of question that could arise at this stage would be whether the facts set out
in the telegraphic request amount on their fact to an extraditable offense under Israel law,
whether the offense is sufficiently serious to justify detaining the suspect in custody or
whether he should be released on bail.
56 Extradition Law, 1954, § 6, 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
57 Extradition (Amendment No. 3) Law, 1975, § 1, 29 L.S.I. 305 (amending Extradition
Law, 1954, § 7(a), 8 L.S.I. 144, 145).
58 Id. (amending Extradition Law § 7(b)).
59 Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Law, 1969, § 1, 23 L.S.I. 210 (adding § 49A to
Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 158).
60 Extradition (Amendment No. 3) Law, 1975, § 1, 29 L.S.I. 305 (amending Extradition
Law § 7(b)(proviso).
61 Id. (amending Extradition Law § 7(c)).
62 Id. (amending Extradition Law § 7(d)).
63 Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, § 34, 19 L.S.I. 158, 163.
64 Extradition Law, 1954, § 5, 8 L.S.I. 144,145. Appeals against the decision of the District
Court with regard to the detention or release of the wanted person are heard by one judge
of the Supreme Court.
65 24(2) P.D. 17 (1970).
66 The President of Israel's Supreme Court noted with approval the following statement
made sixty years ago by Chief Justice Hewart of England: "That does.., not mean that in
no case under the Extradition Acts is the question of bail to be considered. What it does mean
is that where a case is under the Extradition Acts, there is, in addition to the normal considerations which apply to a question of bail, an added ingredient due to the fact that a treaty has
been made with a foreign country." R. v. Phillips, 27 Cox 332, 335 (1922).
67 34(3) P.D. 500 (1980).
68
See Criminal Procedure (Trial upon Information) Ordinance, ch. 36,1 Laws of Palestine

[L.P.] 475.
69 See Criminal Procedure Amendment (Investigation of Felonies and Cause of Death)
Law, 1958, 12 L.S.I. 66, 66; Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 158.
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Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, § 56, 19 L.S.I. 158, 165.
71 22(2) P.D. 85 (1968).
72 See also Pessachovitch v. State of Israel, 31(2) P.D. 449 (1977), in which the Court noted
that a detailed examination of the charges against the wanted person was not one of the
purposes of an extradition hearing. The only question to be determined was whether there
was evidence to serve as a first basis for the charge. In Hanauer v. State of Israel, 33(3) P.D.
173 (1979), the Court found it unnecessary to conduct a detailed analysis of the evidence.
To do so would be to misconceive the purpose of extradition proceedings. For a person to
be subject to extradition, it was sufficient to point to a foothold for the charges in the evidence
supplied by the requesting state. In Engel and Friedman v. State of Israel, 34(3) P.D. 98 (1980),
the Supreme Court again analyzed the requirements of section 9 of the Extradition Law. The
Court explained that it must always bear in mind that consideration of a request for extradition was not consideration of the criminal case itself. It should not, therefore, convert an
extradition hearing into a trial at which the innocence or guilt of the accused would be
decided. The one and only object of the extradition hearing was to find out whether the
evidence against the accused justified his trial before a properly authorized court. Inconsistencies in the evidence need not be resolved at this stage and although mere suspicion was not
enough, it was not necessary that there be evidence which, if proved reliable, would be
sufficient to convict the accused.
73 Evidence Ordinance, §§ 3-5, ch. 54, 2 L.S.I. (New Version) 198.
74 See, e.g., Hackshtatter v. State of Israel, 26(1) P.D. 241, 249 (1972).
75 34(3) P.D. 98.
76 In contrast to American law, the "accused's refraining from testifying may serve to add
weight to the evidence of the prosecution as well as to corroborate such evidence where it
requires corroboration ... " Criminal Procedure (Amendment No. 8) Law, 1976, § 145A, 30
L.S.I. 236, 240.
77 This restriction will not apply where the wanted person left the requesting state after
his extradition or if he has not left the requesting state within sixty days after being given
an opportunity to do so or if the State of Israel has consented in writing to other proceedings
being taken against him. Extradition Law, 1954, § 17(a), 8 L.S.I. 144, 146.
78 29(1) P.D. 589 (1975).
79 Extradition Treaty, Sept. 18, 1959, Israel-South Africa, 10 I.T. 649, 373 U.N.T.S. 47.
80 2 Statutes of the Republic of South Africa 1962 1185, 1197.
81 Extradition Ordinance, ch. 56, 1 L.P. 677.
82 The defect in the treaty was remedied by an exchange of notes between the Governments of Israel and South Africa in May 1976, whereby the appropriate undertaking to act
in accordance with the specialty rule was added to the treaty. See Exchange of Notes Amending the Extradition Treaty of 18 September, 1959, May 2, 1976, Israel-South Africa, 25 I.T.
175.
83 Extradition Treaty, Nov. 12, 1958, Israel-France, art. 17, 10 I.T. 379, 219 U.N.T.S. 215.
84 33(2) P.D. 169 (1979).
70

85 33(3) P.D. 113 (1979).
86 "Where, in pursuance of any arrangement with a foreign state, any person accused or
convicted of any crime which, if committed in England, would be one of the crimes described
in the first schedule to this Act is surrendered by that foreign state, such person shall not,
until he has been restored or had an opportunity of returning to such foreign state, be triable
or tried for any offense committed prior to the surrender in any part of Her Majesty's
dominions other than such of the said crimes as may be proved by the facts on which the
surrender is grounded." Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c.52, § 19.
87 The appellant relied in particular on The King v. Corrigan, 1 K.B. 527 (1931) and R.
v. Aubrey-Fletcher, ex parte Ross-Munro, 1 Q.B. 620 (1968).
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88 Extradition Law, 1954, § 8(2), 8 L.S.I. 144, 145.
89 See, e.g., Convention on Extradition, United States-Israel, supra note 52, art. 10 which
provides that the request for extradition "shall be accompanied by . . . the text of the
applicable laws of the requesting Party including ...the law relating to the limitation of the
legal proceedings or the enforcement of the penalty for the offense."
90 Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, § 7(a)(2), 19 L.S.I. 158, 158-59.
91 Id. at § 7(b).
92 Extradition Law, 1954, § 3, 8 L.S.I. 144, 144.
93 High Court of Justice 59/72 (unpublished opinion).
94 In reference to a similar discretion afforded to the English Home Secretary, it was said
that "the Secretary of State can decide not to grant the request for extradition if in the exercise
of his discretion he thinks that it is proper to take that course." Schtraks v. Government of
Israel, [1964] A.C. 556, 559. See also Atkinson v. United States Government, [1971] A.C. 197,
232, where it was said that ".... Parliament must have intended the Secretary of State to use
that power whenever in his view it would be wrong, unjust or oppressive to surrender the
man."

95 Since the exercise of the Minister of Justice's discretion is an administrative and not
a judicial matter, there are no published reports of the way in which he uses his power in
this matter.
96 The Preamble to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State refers to the need
to solve the problem of Jewish homelessness by establishing a State "which would open the
gates of the homeland wide to every Jew." Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
Israel, preamble, 1 L.S.T. 3, 3-4. The Declaration goes on to set out certain basic principles
by which the new State of Israel is to be governed. The first of these principles is that the
State shall be open for Jewish immigration. Id. at 4.
97 Law of Return, 1950, 1 L.S.I. 114, 114.
98 Nationality Law, 1952, § 2(a), 6 L.S.I. 50, 50. See M. D. GOULOMAN, ISRAEL NATIONALITY

LAW (1970), for a survey of the subject of Israeli nationality.
99 Table 22B, STATISTICAL ABsRAcrs OF ISRAEL (1981).

100 Law of Return, 1950, 1 L.S.I. 114.
101 A recent decision of the Supreme Court has perhaps eased the Minister's problem in
this regard. Two would-be immigrants from Canada were wanted for rape and other sexual
offenses. They had fled to Israel prior to their trial in Canada but proceedings for their
extradition were nearing completion. The Court held that the Minister was entitled, in these
circumstances, to withhold the grant of an immigrant's visa until the extradition proceedings
and the subsequent trial in Canada had been completed. Only then would the Minister have
to take his decision as to whether the exception to the Law of Return was to be applied. See
Engel and Friedman v. Minister of Justice, 34(4) P.D. 329 (1980).
102 Convention on Extradition, United States-Israel, art. 4, supra note 52.
103 31(2) P.D. 449 (1977).
104 European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957-Nov. 29, 1965, 17 I.T. 87, 359
U.N.T.S. 273.
105 32 L.S.I. 63.

106 Id. The law added section 1A to the Extradition Law, 8 L.S.I. 144, which provided that
"an Israel national shall not be extradited save for an offense committed before he became
an Israel national."
107 See Attorney General v. Azen, Misc. App. 137/78 (unpublished).
108 34(4) P.D. 329 (1980).
10 9 See Attorney General v. Glickman, Misc. App. 1384/78 (unpublished). An Australian
lawyer, charged in Melbourne with theft and embezzlement, sought to delay the opening of
his extradition trial in Israel until the hearing of a petition he had filed with the High Court
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of Justice for an order requiring the Minister of the Interior to recognize him as a new

immigrant under the Law of Return. The Tel Aviv District Court rejected the application for
deferment of the extradition trial, since even if the High Court of Justice petition were to
succeed, the lawyer's newly acquired nationality by return would not affect his liability to
extradition.
110 Section 14 of the Evidence Ordinance provides that "notwithstanding anything in the
Criminal Procedure Law, 1965, where evidence has been taken outside the jurisdiction of the
Courts of Israel in virtue of any treaty, agreement or law, for the purpose of any criminal
proceeding in Israel, the court may permit the record of any evidence so taken to be submitted
as evidence in a trial, provided that the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for
the absence of the witness who gave the evidence in the record and that the accused or his
attorney were afforded the opportunity of cross-examining the witness at the time the
evidence was taken."
To date it has proved most difficult to make use of this section. First, its use depends on
the existence of a treaty or agreement with the state where the evidence is to be taken. Second,
difficulty arises with regard to the requirement ensuring the accused's right of cross-examination. Is it sufficient merely to notify the accused of the date and place at which evidence will
be taken abroad so that he can appoint an attorney to attend and cross-examine the witness?
Is the State of Israel obliged to pay for defense counsel? If not, will not an accused lacking
in means be deprived of the fundamental right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses?
Unless the accused himself is present at the cross-examination in order to react to whatever
is said by the prosecution witness and give the necessary instructions to his counsel, how can
the cross-examination be effective? Third, it is difficult to know whether the judge would
regard the mere expense of bringing a critical witness to Israel as "good reason for the absence
of the witness."
111 Accord, I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADmON i INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971)(the proposal is similar
to that proposed by Shearer as a solution to the problem of the extradition of a national);
see also Draft Convention on Expatriation of Accused Persons for Trial and Sentence and Repatriation for
Enforcement of Sentence, INsERNATioNAL LAW AssocrTIoN, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-EIGHm CONFERENCE
HELD AT MANIA 477 (1980).
112 33(1) P.D. 752 (1979).
113 Seegenerally 18 U.S.C. § 4202-4209.

114 34(3) P.D. 500 (1980).

